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Introduction 
In the rhetorical question, ‘Whatever Happened to Imperialism?’, we may expect to 
be ushered into a debate regarding the necessity of a renewal of Marxist diagnosis of 
Western economic imperialism and its effects on the global South. This essay has a 
slightly different imperative. I explore the necessity of rethinking the parameters by 
which we use terms such as imperialism and colonialism in a postcolonial geopolitical 
context in order to make visible the coloniality of the (post) colonial nation-state. 
More specifically, I discuss this issue in the context of India’s relationship with 
Kashmir (shorthand for the State of Jammu and Kashmir). While there is an assertion 
in scholarship regarding India as an occupying and/or imperial power in relation to 
Kashmir,1 this article explores postcolonial theorisation of the relationship between 
colonialism and nationalism so that this assertion may be substantiated. Dibyesh 
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Anand has made an important argument regarding the need to rethink India and China 
as ‘postcolonial informal empires’ through the nexus between ‘postcolonial, national, 
and imperial impulses’.2 Anand’s argument engages with macro political and 
economic theories and histories about and of China and India. He argues that China 
and India’s imperialisms stem from a ‘majoritarian civilizational-national core’ in 
relation to ‘peripheral identities,’ which may be considered ethno-nationalisms.3 This 
article follows a slightly different trajectory; I engage specifically with postcolonial 
scholarship, and argue for the necessity of the lens of sovereignty in thinking about 
(post) colonial imperialism and colonialism. Thus, Anand’s discussion of formal 
equality within a nationalist framework and informal imperialism may not be a 
necessary distinction to make where popular sovereignty is denied. I begin with a 
recent online debate about Indian nationalism that will demonstrate why such a 
rethinking of parameters is a necessary. 
 
In 2015, Partha Chatterjee, the Subaltern Studies scholar, published an essay in 
Savage Mind, supporting the boycott of Israeli institutions. In outlining Israel’s 
coloniality in relation to Palestine, Chatterjee defensively clarifies ‘lest he be accused 
of double standards’ that he has not ‘failed to see the signs of colonial superiority in 
the country of which I am a citizen’ – meaning India.4  He then implies that he has 
some knowledge of the oppression of Kashmiris and the indigenous people of Tripura 
by Indians, but does not indicate much else. In response to this curious reference, 
Huma Dar, a US-based Kashmiri anthropologist, deconstructs Chatterjee’s political 
move. Dar questions why it is that a ‘colonial occupation of Kashmir’ remains 
‘mostly unquestioned by, and invisible to, even the most critical of Indian 
intelligentsia, thus pointing to perhaps a subtle unacknowledged, uninterrogated 
nationalism amongst those otherwise apprehensive of nationalism.’5 For Dar, the 
signs of Indian colonialism are evident in the state violence that she hyperlinks to - in 
terms of unmarked mass graves, routine sexual violence and torture, massacres and 
enforced disappearances and “fake encounters”’.6 Her question makes visible this 
strangeness of silence on the struggle for Kashmiri sovereignty given a critical 
intelligentsia’s support for Palestinian sovereignty.  
 
In response, Chatterjee endorses Dar’s critique and explains that he raised the issue of 
‘double standards’ in order to explain his negotiation of ‘the terrain of colonial and 
 3 
national power relations in which one is necessarily implicated.’7 He states that he 
had not visited Kashmir or Tripura because he would ‘feel powerless’ – presumably 
to act upon the knowledge of the signs of occupation or colonialism.8 One must 
remember here that the context of this conversation is Chatterjee’s discussion of the 
boycott of Israeli academic institutions in relation to Palestine’s struggle for self-
determination. Hence, Chatterjee seems capable of acting upon his knowledge of 
Palestinian oppression, which he lists, even though he has not visited the place. But 
for some strange reason, as an academic with a rather powerful voice, he felt 
powerless or unable to articulate a critique of Indian colonial nationalism and its 
violent effects in the context of Kashmiri struggle for self-determination in that 
particular moment.  
 
Chatterjee’s uncomfortable position has been seemingly rectified in subsequent 
opinion pieces (The Telegraph, July 21, 2016; The Wire, June 2, 2017). After the 
large scale Kashmiri uprising in 2016 -- following the death of the Hizb-ul-
Mujahideen militant Commander Burhan Wani and the Indian state’s brutal violence 
through a 100+ killings and a 1000+ partial and complete blindings including those of 
teenagers and children9 -- Chatterjee argued in The Telegraph that the uprising was a 
consequence of a ‘ recipe for treating Kashmir as a colonial possession.’ By using the 
term recipe, Chatterjee suggests that colonial possession could be the outcome of the 
current state actions.  Similarly, after the use of a shawl weaver, Farooq Dar, as a 
human shield by the Indian army in the 2017 local elections in Kashmir, Chatterjee 
has stated that the Indian army is behaving ‘like an occupying force in a conquered 
colony’ (emphasis mine). While Chatterjee has likened the situation to colonialism, he 
appears to shy away from suggesting that Kashmir has been experiencing colonial 
treatment or occupation since 1947 – at a time when India and Pakistan were involved 
in the struggle over the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir. The tenor of these 
articles is a critique not of Indian colonialism in Kashmir, but of Indian nationalism. It 
is telling, for example, that in The Telegraph, Chatterjee critiques the ‘bankruptcy of 
the politics that has tried so far to accommodate Kashmir’s national aspirations within 
the Indian federal system.’ So, the question is, if Indian nationalist politics were not 
bankrupt, could Kashmir’s national aspirations be accommodated within the Indian 
federal system? This is a moot point and it depends on a perspectival reading of 
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Kashmir’s history regarding the 1947 instrument of accession and its subsequent 
legacy – a debate which I will discuss a little later in the paper.  
 
In terms of the scope of this paper, Dar’s thesis regarding ‘uninterrogated’ 
nationalism even as postcolonial and subaltern scholars critique Indian nationalism 
and risk being called ‘anti-national’ by a Hindutva regime under Prime Minister 
Modi’s leadership,10 I suggest, necessitates further scrutiny. The broader problematic 
has to do with the structural concealment of the relationship between postcolonial 
nation-states and their possible imperial or colonial arrangements? To address this 
issue, the paper will forward the thesis that the lens of sovereignty studies, rather than 
a postcolonial focus on a West/non-West divide may shed light on the forms of 
colonialism, imperialism and occupation by the postcolonial state. Mridu Rai has 
outlined a historical account of the operation of a Hinduised sovereignty in Kashmir.11 
Kamala Visweswaran references the poststructuralist conceptual scaffolding of 
sovereignty in thinking about occupation in Kashmir.12 Visweswaran’s question as to 
how the question of occupation may force a ‘re-reckoning with the body of 
postcolonial theory’, in effect, guides this examination.13 I turn to Partha Chatterjee’s 
classic formulation of anti-colonial nationalisms to address the problem of coloniality 
in Indian nationalism.14 
 
Theorising Postcolonial Nationalisms 
In theorizing postcolonial nationalisms, Chatterjee argues that both conservative and 
progressive scholars of nationalism such as John Plamenatz, Elie Kedourie, Ernest 
Gellner, Anthony Smith and Benedict Anderson suggest that postcolonial 
nationalisms are derivative – ‘modular’ in Anderson’s discussion.15 Chatterjee’s 
central critique of these scholars, however, is not so much that they state or assume 
that ‘Eastern’ nationalisms are derivative of Western ones, but that none of these 
scholars are able to formulate the research problem of the contradictions of 
nationalism in the anti-colonial context. Or as Chatterjee states – neither liberal nor 
conservative bourgeois – rationalist thought can pose the theoretical problem: ‘why is 
it that non-European colonial countries have no historical alternative but to try to 
approximate the given attributes of modernity when that very process of 
approximation means their continued subjection under a world order which only sets 
their tasks for them and over which they have no control?’16  For Chatterjee, the 
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answer to this question lies not just in military power or ‘industrial strength’, but in 
the power of thought ‘which can dominate and subjugate.’17 And to pose such a 
question, Chatterjee argues, would be to ‘approach the field of discourse, historical, 
philosophical and scientific, as a battleground of political power.’18 In other words, 
Chatterjee is referencing colonial and imperial thought as responsible for the 
continued subjection of the postcolonial subject in the context of nationalism. This 
discursive problem leads to Chatterjee’s formulation of the distinction between the 
problematic and thematic of Indian nationalism, which Chatterjee argues is 
generalizable across other anti-colonial and postcolonial contexts. 
 
A brief recounting of the problematic and the thematic may be necessary here. In the 
anti-colonial context, the problematic has to do with the claims of the ideology of a 
nationalism which posits certain historical possibilities – that of the repudiation of 
colonialism’s Orientalist understanding – as Anouar Abdel-Malik (1963) has argued - 
of the colonized or the ‘Orient’ as  “non-active, non-autonomous” and “non-
sovereign.”’19 The problematic, therefore, is the point of departure from the 
Orientalist thought of colonialism – nationalist discourse offers a horizon of political 
possibilities where the colonized can assert themselves as active and sovereign. The 
thematic, however, appears to be a more complicated issue; it references ‘the 
epistemological as well as ethical system which provides a framework of elements 
and rules.’20 The thematic, while not necessarily derivative, depends selectively on 
colonial thought and practice – in other words, on colonial practices of development 
and modernity. A national bourgeoisie is dominated by the need to work within this 
thematic, within colonial epistemology and ethics regarding the development of the 
nation-state. Or as Chatterjee asks: ‘Can nationalist thought produce a discourse of 
order while daring to negate the very foundations of a system of knowledge that has 
conquered the world?  How far can it succeed in maintaining its difference from a 
discourse that seeks to dominate it?’21 In asking this question, what Chatterjee seeks 
to explore is not so much the idea that nationalist thought is colonial in some 
simplistic manner, but to examine how Indian nationalist thought and power, led by 
the Indian national bourgeoisie, produces a different rather than a purely derivative 
form of nationalism through the contradictions that the problematic and the thematic 
generate.  
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In Chatterjee’s analysis, the Indian nationalist bourgeoisie proceeds to address the 
contradictions between the problematic and the thematic by engaging in the classic 
Gramscian ‘war of position’ so that it can ‘bring under the sway of a nationalist 
ideology and political programme the overwhelming part of the popular elements in 
the nation, and particularly the vast mass of peasants.’22 Specifically, Chatterjee 
argues that ‘Gandhian ideology’ – which attempts to function outside the thematic of 
post-Enlightenment thought  - in effect becomes ‘the historical possibility’ for the 
‘political appropriation of the subaltern classes by a bourgeoisie aspiring for 
hegemony in the new nation-state.’23 Gandhian ideology, or Gandhism as Chatterjee 
calls it, is able to appropriate the subaltern classes because of his moral authority and 
his invocation of a version of the Hindu understanding of RamaRajya (rule of Ram). 
If we examine the tenor of Chatterjee’s critique, his anti-Orientalist defense of the  
‘content’ of Indian anti-colonial nationalist politics through the contradictions of the 
problematic and thematic of Indian nationalism becomes apparent. Chatterjee is 
critical of the appropriation of the revolutionary potential of India’s subaltern politics 
by its national bourgeoisie – their instrumental use of Gandhism - through the war of 
position. But this study of Indian nationalism is both a defence of it against Western 
scholars who would treat it in an Orientalist manner and a critique of India’s native 
bourgeoisie for preventing a genuine national revolution. And Chatterjee is arguing to 
a certain extent, even though he does not articulate it in this way, for an anti-
Orientalist understanding of nationalist leadership and discourse as possessing the 
capacity for a decolonizing revolutionary sovereignty even though this sovereignty is 
not independent of the larger context of colonial discourse of development and 
modernity. 
 
Absent in the above account, however, is the idea that the newly formed nation-state 
could itself behave in a colonial or imperial manner during the transition from 
colonial to national rule. In relation to the territorial borders of the nation-state, there 
has been a great deal of the scholarship on the partition of the subcontinent and the 
violent legacy of British colonial rule. Some of the debates remain centered around 
British culpability regarding partition, while other accounts such as Ayesha Jalal’s 
lays some responsibility on the shoulders of the soft Hindutva or Hindu nationalist 
discourse of the Indian National Congress.24 Historians have outlined the 
negotiations, arrangements, and decisions regarding princely state territories in India 
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and Pakistan.25 Yet, what remains underexplored is the manner in which postcolonial 
nationalism is also an expansionist project. The argument that the techniques of 
colonial sovereignty are frequently used with reference to law and governance is 
present in critiques of Indian nationalism.26 Yet, these arguments suggest a reliance 
on British colonial sovereignty rather than an expansion of Indian sovereignty. If this 
is the case, then a critique of a postcolonial theoretical approach becomes necessary 
not only from Marxist perspectives as has been dominant in recent discussions of 
Indian nationalism, but from the theoretical and political trajectory of sovereignty 
studies. 
 
I would like to discuss two Marxist critiques of Chatterjee’s discussion of Indian 
nationalism to suggest the importance of critique from the perspective of the literature 
on sovereignty. Vivek Chibber has offered a strident critique of Chatterjee and the 
Subaltern Studies collective in general, making the case for a Marxist understanding 
of universal history rather than a defence of postcolonial difference.27 Chibber’s main 
critique appears to be two-fold.  Firstly, he suggests that radical Marxist intellectuals 
had already theorized the form of the nation as a colonial project (in terms of it as a 
colonial thematic) before Partha Chatterjee’s discussion of it, and secondly that 
Chatterjee’s discussion of anti-colonial nationalism as relying on the structures of 
Enlightenment thought is in fact an Orientalist one. For example, Chatterjee’s critique 
of Nehru’s program of economic modernization relies on the idea that Nehru takes up 
colonial ideas of development based on Enlightenment reason. Chibber argues that 
Nehru may have taken on a program of modernization not because it was an 
internalized colonial ideology, but it was an imperative, a response to capitalist 
‘influence on global affairs.’28 Or as Chibber suggests, ‘even if Nehru had never been 
exposed to the colonial thematic . . . even if he had detested the idea of 
modernization, he would have good reason to accept it anyway.’29 This thesis is 
substantiated by the idea that ‘even European nations, which never underwent 
colonial subjugation, felt compelled to adopt a similar agenda.’30 So Chibber rejects 
the idea that it is colonial thought or ideology that is part of the thematic contradiction 
for a postcolonial nation-state. Chibber blames Partha Chatterjee and the Subaltern 
Studies Collective for an Orientalist relegation of ‘Reason’ to colonial Enlightenment 
thought. In doing so, Chibber ascribes a sovereign (even if dependent on a 
modernization imperative) agency to the postcolonial nation-state. Yet, in Chibber’s 
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account, the postcolonial nation-state, while charged with a bourgeois capitalist 
imperative, remains innocent of its own colonial and imperial techniques. The idea of 
‘internal colonialism’ within postcolonial nation-states, is of course, known within 
Marxist scholarship. Drawing on Latin American Marxism, world systems theorist 
Andre Gunder Frank has addressed the issue of ‘internal colonialisms’ to describe the 
phenomenon of uneven development.31 But the very phrase ‘internal colonialism’ 
assumes the unity of the nation-state. In other words, the nation-state may be seen as 
colonising those within its borders, but the borders of the nation-state are assumed as 
given. What remains unaccounted for is the theorization of the postcolonial nation-
state as engaging in its expansionary colonial projects. 
 
Pothik Ghosh’s recent Marxist critique of Chatterjee and the Subaltern Studies 
collective’s is a bit more convincing in that he acknowledges Indian nationalism’s 
colonial and capitalist interest in Kashmir. In particular, Ghosh critiques Chatterjee’s 
theoretical inability to discuss the Indian nation-state for its colonial occupation of 
Kashmir. Ghosh argues that for Gramsci, the theorization of the subaltern has more to 
do with ‘subalternity as a necessary condition – an objective position in the concrete – 
that has in it the potential for generating a revolutionary-proletarian subjectivity’ in 
the context of a ‘crisis of the horizon or structure of valourisation, measure, 
distribution and/or representation.’32 A subaltern position would thus be a position 
‘from where a revolutionary-proletarian politics that would suspend this structure of 
constitutive redemption or duality could possibly be constructed.’33 Thus subalternity, 
according to Ghosh’s reading of Gramsci, ‘is crucial only insofar as it marks, in and 
through its diverse concreteness, subject-positions that are potentially proletarian.’34 
Ghosh argues that Chatterjee and the Subaltern Studies Collective make the error of 
simply affirming subaltern positions in their historical diversity and so continue the 
politics of passive revolution, a politics that Chatterjee accuses the Indian bourgeoisie 
of at the moment of their appropriation of subaltern politics. In this sense, Ghosh 
argues that Chatterjee can only read Kashmiri nationalism as an ethno-nationalism 
within an Indian federalist nationalism when he ought to be critiquing the political 
economy of India’s colonial occupation in Kashmir. Or as Ghosh states, Indian 
nationalism’s ideology ‘serves its imperial project of politically managing the South 
Asian moment of the globalising late-capitalist conjuncture.’35 Such a critique, 
drawing on Gramsci’s understanding of the subaltern is promising. And to articulate 
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Indian imperialism, it would need to pay attention to the question of territorial and 
political sovereignty, so frequently articulated in the phrase ‘Kashmir is an integral 
part of India’, which is not explicable only through the Indian state’s attempt to 
manage a ‘globalising late-capitalist conjuncture.’36   
 
A focus on sovereignty in the context of postcolonial nationalisms, I would argue, 
would go further than the contradictions of the ‘problematic’ and the ‘thematic’, it 
would go beyond the Fanonion articulation of bourgeois collaborations between a 
colonial and a native elite, and beyond the Gramscian understanding of the coopted 
revolutionary potential of subalternity.37 The importance of drawing on sovereignty 
studies becomes visible if we ask the following questions: how do postcolonial 
nation-states acquire territories without the popular consent of the regions that they 
rule? What sovereign decisions are required to acquire these territories? How do these 
acquisitions demonstrate the use of imperial or colonial techniques by postcolonial 
nation-states? 
 
Colonialism and Sovereignty through a (post) colonial lens 
Definitions of sovereignty, colonialism and imperialism might be useful in order to 
think through the relationships between these concepts in relation to the scope of this 
paper. Drawing on Thomas Hobbes, Jean Bodin and Carl Schmitt, Wendy Brown has 
usefully pointed out that a poststructuralist understanding of sovereignty’s 
‘indispensable features’ include ‘supremacy (no higher power), perpetuity over time 
(no term limits), decisionism (no boundedness by or submission to law), absoluteness 
and completeness (sovereignty cannot be probably or partial), non-transferability 
(sovereignty cannot be conferred without canceling itself), and specified jurisdiction 
(territoriality).’38 Nasser Hussain reminds us that the figure of sovereignty is an 
archaic one that was thought to have disappeared in the ‘rule-bound format of a 
modern electoral democracy.’39 Yet, in theorizing forms of power in modernity, 
Michel Foucault points to the role of sovereignty as having a ‘historical link’ to the 
‘problem of choices of government.’40 Foucault, as is well known, attempted to 
displace the figure of sovereignty in theorizing the microphysics of power.  Yet, in his 
later work, he suggested the triangle of ‘sovereignty-discipline-government’ as a more 
useful way of about thinking about the exercise of power.41 The features that Brown 
describes may be said to be fictions of the authority of sovereignty and its evolution in 
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that they are continually subject to politics, to war, and to relations of power. In the 
colonial context, sovereignty by conquest and appropriation of resources remains a 
classic description. Achille Mbembe’s Necropolitics, for example, describes colonial 
sovereignty as ‘a formation of terror.’42 Mbembe argues that for the European 
juridical order, the world was divided into two parts, the sovereignty of European 
states on the one hand and ‘those parts of the globe available for colonial 
appropriation.’43 While this description of colonial sovereignty is appropriate for the 
classic European colonial period that Mbembe is referring to, I would suggest that in 
the context of postcolonial nationalisms, we may need to rework this understanding of 
colonial sovereignty and its West and non-West demarcation – which was made by 
the European colonial project.44 
 
A poststructuralist emphasis on the supremacist, decisionist attributes of colonial 
sovereignty, I would argue, does allow for the study of the relationship between 
sovereignty, imperialism, colonialism and postcolonial nationalisms. But a brief 
glance at some classic postcolonial texts shows that this relationship remains 
underexplored. Edward Said references sovereignty and governmentality through the 
idea that ‘imperialism’ means the practice, the theory, and the attitudes of a 
dominating metropolitan centre ruling a distant territory; ‘colonialism’, which is 
almost always a consequence of ‘”imperialism” is the implanting of settlements on 
distant territory.’45 We get a sense here of the meanings of sovereignty by conquest 
but also governmentality through imperialism – where governmentality ensures the 
non-autonomy of distant territories. For Said, the imperialism referenced here would 
mean former colonies. In particular, Said explores the relationship of the West to the 
Middle-East and North Africa. In this sense, Said’s discussion of imperialism and 
colonialism remains within the West/non-West Orientalist divide and early 20th 
century understandings of colonial and racial difference. Said argues that ‘direct 
colonialism has largely ended; imperialism . . . lingers where it has always been, in a 
kind of general cultural sphere as well as in specific political, ideological, economic, 
and social practices.’46 Said, of course, does not reference the settler-colonial contexts 
of the US, Australia, and Canada where, in various ways, both direct and indirect 
colonialisms, one could argue, still remains effective. And an understanding of the 
end of direct colonialism may need to be rethought especially in a post 9/11 era where 
economic or political imperialism and colonial occupation needs to be seen in tandem 
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with the ways in which technologies of surveillance and warfare transform or perhaps 
even blur the lines between imperialism and colonialism. So, for example, US drones 
over Pakistani airpace cannot only be classified as a case of US imperialism, but 
could be read as an expression of colonial sovereignty – i.e., US occupation of 
Pakistani airspace. Sovereignty and governmentality are referenced through V.Y. 
Mudimbe’s classic definition of colonialism in relation to the African continent. 
Mudimbe defines colonialism as ‘the domination of physical space, the reformation of 
natives’ minds, and the integration of local economic histories into the Western 
perspective.’47 Mudimbe’s study references and relies on Marxist scholarship which 
articulates the process by which European colonialism and imperialism created the 
underdevelopment of non-Western worlds.48 Mudimbe’s study too invokes the 
West/non-West divide. 
 
From a legal studies perspective, Nasser Hussain addresses the exercise of colonial 
sovereignty more directly through the ‘tension between political exigencies and legal 
rule’ and its ‘corresponding effects upon the structure of both the colonial and 
ultimately the postcolonial state.’49 In the 19th century, the British empire ‘required a 
new conception of sovereignty, one that was neither despotic nor democratic’ in order 
to rule subjects who were not slaves (as in settler-colonies such as the US).50 Colonial 
sovereignty, as Hussain explains it, based as it was upon conquest (at first mercantile 
then Crown) in India, had to depend on the legitimacy of the rule of law. So ‘colonial 
lawful rule emerges as a median category.’51 Hussain argues that the rule of law 
becomes a form of ‘sovereignty and governmentality: rule that is lawful, as it lays 
claim to legitimacy through law, but also one that is literally full of law, full of rules 
that hierarchalize, bureaucratize, media, and channel power.’52 And yet, the rule of 
law also depended on colonial and racial difference as Partha Chatterjee53 has pointed 
out. It is this colonial and racial difference that also necessitates the Schmittian 
movement between the creation of the rule and its exception. Or as Hussein points 
out, ‘colonialism is the best historical example for any theoretical study of norm and 
exception, rule of law and emergency.’54 The relationship between imperialism, 
colonialism and sovereignty, therefore, was justified with reference to the rule of law 
but such a justification was continually exposed by colonial sovereignty’s movement 
between the rule of law and states of exceptions. The legitimacy of anti-colonial 
nationalist movements, relying as they did on mass mobilisations of people – 
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indicating popular will, often depended on pointing out the ways in which colonial 
and racial difference was at the heart of this exercise of colonial sovereignty.  
 
From a political philosophy perspective, Achille Mbembe’s discussion of postcolonial 
sovereignty in the African context addresses a more contemporary relationship 
between colonial and postcolonial sovereignty.55 Paying attention to the ways in 
which the relationship between colonial sovereignty and postcolonial nation-states has 
been theorised and discussed, Mbembe critiques some of the scholarship on state and 
power ‘inspired by Foucauldian’ and ‘neo-Gramscian’ paradigms which merely 
emphasise discourse and representation or the ‘rediscovery of the subaltern subject’ 
through the conceptual paradigms of hegemony, moral economy, agency and 
resistance.56 In saying this, Mbembe is not arguing against the use of concepts such as 
discourse or representation, but suggests that ‘discourses and representations have 
materiality.’57 Mbembe’s overarching argument in the book is the necessity to pay 
attention to what ‘African states, societies, and economies’ are rather than what they 
are not.58 In this context, Mbembe argues for understanding the postcolony as having 
‘multiple durées made up of discontinuities, reversals, inertias, and swings that 
overlay one another, interpenetrate one another, and envelope one another: an 
entanglement.’59 In this entanglement, through various case studies of nation-states in 
different African countries, Mbembe reads postcolonial regimes as having ‘several 
cultures, heritages, and traditions of which the features have become entangled over 
time.’60 These regimes have the ‘look of “custom” without being reducible to it, and 
partakes of “modernity” without being wholly included in it.’61 For Mbembe, 
‘colonial rationality’ is a part of postcolonial ‘rationality or knowledge.’62 He argues 
that ‘postcolonial state forms have inherited’ the ‘regime of impunity’ that was part of 
colonial sovereignty’63 Thus Mbembe’s thesis goes a bit further than Said and 
Mudimbe in arguing for examining the entangled ways in which postcolonial 
nationalist sovereignty is exercised in African nation-states.  
 
Yet, despite some of their differences, these arguments account for the operations of 
postcolonial sovereignty with reference to Europe’s colonial sovereignty whether 
these may be imperial, colonial or entangled relations. I do not suggest that we do 
away with the lens that provides a diagnosis of imperial or colonial relations between 
the West/non-West as this framing may be valid in many contexts. But perhaps it is 
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important to recognize why it is that the accounts of the relationship between 
sovereignty, imperialism and colonialism remain characterized by this binary even 
when it may not be entirely relevant. For theorists like Said or Mudimbe, economic 
and political dominance of the ‘West’ disallows the autonomy of post-colonial nation-
states. For Hussain and Mbembe, the inheritance of a legal and political infrastructure 
and the practices of postcolonial sovereignty point to the failure of the promise of 
decolonisation. And, what is assumed, even if unsaid, is the capacity of postcolonial 
nation-states to pose a decolonising challenge to Western colonial and imperial 
interests through postcolonial nationalisms. It is perhaps this promise that ensures the 
lack of attention by theorists of colonialism or postcolonial nationalism to the 
capacity of postcolonial nationalisms to generate their own forms of colonial or 
imperial relations through attention to territorial and political sovereignty. In this 
sense, many postcolonial theorists appear to explore the disjuncture between the 
promise of racial, economic, and political liberation by postcolonial nation-states and 
their failure to overthrow Western colonial and imperialist sovereignty in the 20th 
century. However, precisely because there exist a variety of sovereignty struggles 
within postcolonial contexts (i.e., Kashmir or Manipur in India, Balochistan in 
Pakistan, Aceh in Indonesia), I suggest that a different lens drawing on sovereignty 
studies may reveal a more complex diagnosis of contemporary geopolitical relations 
than sole reliance on a postcolonial theoretical approach. To this end, the next section 
explores the issue of the techniques of Indian nationalist imperial and colonial 
sovereignty in Kashmir.  
 
(Post) colonial India and Kashmir 
It is interesting to note that Nasser Hussain’s study of the exercise of British colonial 
sovereignty in India in the 19th century could be slightly reframed in thinking about 
the relationship between (post) colonial India and Kashmir. Hussain’s phrasing 
regarding ‘a new conception of sovereignty, one that was neither despotic nor 
democratic,’ may be pertinent in thinking about the ways in which Indian sovereignty 
functions in Kashmir.64 The key here is the reference to a justificatory narrative that 
allows for undemocratic and/or despotic practices of (post) colonial sovereignty. In 
the following section, I explore postcolonial India’s undemocratic practice of 
postcolonial sovereignty through the justificatory narrative of Kashmir’s accession to 
India. 
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If we explore the history of the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir and its 
accession, something of the nature of denied Kashmiri sovereignty begins to become 
visible. Major historians of Kashmir differ in emphasis or understandings of the 
accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India, but outline a fairly consistent chronicle of 
pre-1947 and post-1947 events, which has resulted in current fraught relationship 
between the Kashmir Valley and the Government of India. From the time of the 
Treaty of Amritsar (1846), when the British sold the Valley of Kashmir to the Dogra 
ruler of Jammu, Gulab Singh, to Kashmir’s accession to India by the unpopular 
Maharaja Hari Singh, the consistency lies in the narrative of Kashmir as the accession 
of territory and people from one regime to another without the assent of the people of 
Jammu and Kashmir.65 This story has a longer history if we reference the 15th century 
invasion of Kashmir by the Emperor Akbar, and the subsequent occupations or 
arrangements of power by Afghani and the Sikh empires.66 However, the 1846 Treaty 
of Amritsar in the aftermath of the Anglo-Sikh war provides the most direct link with 
the contemporary history of Kashmir where the British East India Company sold 
Kashmir to Gulab Singh for 75 lakhs and an annual token recognition of supremacy 
(sovereignty) of ‘one horse, twelve shawl goats of approved breed (six male and six 
female) and three pairs of Cashmere shawls.’67 This event occurs ten years before the 
1857 Sepoy Mutiny, after which the British Crown takes over the territories amassed 
by the British East India Company. A hundred years later, Gulab Singh’s grandson, 
Maharajah Hari Singh waits to decide whether to remain independent or to accede the 
princely state of Jammu and Kashmir to Pakistan or India.  
 
The realpolitik story that shaped Kashmir’s accession to India follows a number of 
twists and turns. Sumantra Bose states that the Maharaja of Kashmir had made a deal 
with Pakistan due to the Kashmiri National Congress’s (led by Kashmir’s first Prime 
Minister Sheikh Abdullah) links with the Indian leadership and the threat that the 
Poonch uprising posed in early 1947 to the state due to its harsh taxation practices.68 
Christopher Snedden’s research emphasises a number of Kashmiri challenges to 
Dogra rule since the 1930s, motivated by improving the lot of the oppressed Muslim 
majority under the Maharaja’s rule, which informed the Maharajah’s indecision as 
well as his hurried decision to accede to India.69 A dominant narrative of the 
circumstance of accession is that of the raid of Pukhtoon tribes on the 22nd of October 
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1947, propelled the Maharajah to appeal to the Indian government for help.  The raid, 
according to Alastair Lamb was not initially perceived to be either a major threat or 
instigated by Pakistan by the officials of the state of Jammu and Kashmir.  The ‘main 
danger’ appeared to be ‘that the crisis would be exploited in the Vale’ (Kashmir 
Valley) ‘by opponents of Dogra rule.’70  
 
However, once the situation was presented to the Indian Defence Committee, the raid 
was presented as ‘an invasion of tribesmen from the North-West frontier, sponsored 
by the Government of Pakistan.’71 As Sumantra Bose argues, following the 
Maharajah’s appeal, Nehru, Patel and others were advised by Lord Mountbatten (the 
departing British governor General) not to send in troops without securing Kashmir’s 
accession to India.72 Alistair Lamb and Victoria Schofield argue that it would have 
been impossible for the instrument of accession to be signed before the landing of 
Indian troops in Srinagar on October 27, 1947.  They base their claims on the archival 
record of a letter from Acting British Deputy High Commissioner, Alexander Symon, 
in Delhi to Archibald Carter, the Head of the Commonwealth Relations Office. This 
letter disputes V.P. Menon’s published account that he flew to Jammu on the evening 
of October 26 to get the signature of the Maharajah on the accession document.73 
Symon’s letter states that Menon had been unable to fly to Srinagar that evening. The 
landing of Indian troops in Sringar before the accession was signed by the Maharajah 
makes the act an invasion of Kashmiri sovereignty according to international law.74 
The significance of the inconsistency between Menon and Symon’s account, 
Schofield argues is India’s claim ‘for a legal right to be in Kashmir, including the 
ability to control the circumstances of holding a plebiscite.’75 Based on archival 
research of letters, memos and speeches, A.G. Noorani goes further than all the above 
accounts in making the case that Jawaharlal Nehru was ‘active’ and assertive before 
1947 that ‘Kashmir had no other choice but accession to India.’76 In Noorani’s 
account, India’s Prime Minister’s promise of a plebiscite for Kashmiris was based on 
the support for accession to India.77  
 
Noorani’s account is corroborated by Masrook Dar. Dar cites Jawaharlal Nehru’s 
promise broadcast on All India Radio on the 2nd of November, 1947:  
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‘We have declared that the fate of Kashmir is ultimately to be decided by the people. . 
. . We will not, and cannot back out of it. We are prepared when peace and law and 
order have been established to have a referendum held under international auspices 
like the United Nations. We want it to be a fair and just Reference to the people, and 
we shall accept their verdict. I can imagine no fairer and juster offer.’78  
 
Dar’s account of this promise is that it remained on paper.  In realpolitik terms, the 
issue of the plebiscite was premised on the Indian government’s confidence as to 
whether India could win the plebiscite. The subsequent fraught relationship between 
Sheikh Abdullah, Chief Minister of Jammu and Kashmir and Prime Minister 
Jawaharlal Nehru ensured that the plebiscite never took place. In 1950, as Dar reads 
it, United Nations Representative, Sir Owen Dixon had a plan (following UN Security 
Council Resolution 80) for demilitarization and the administration of a plebiscite. The 
plan involved dividing Ladakh and Jammu between India and Pakistan and allowing 
for a plebiscite in the Kashmir Valley. India did not accept the plan even though 
Pakistan agreed to it. Subsequent to the events of 1947, and the wars between India 
and Pakistan, India ensured a special autonomous status for the state of Jammu and 
Kashmir through article 370 in the Indian constitution. The status of Kashmir as an 
international dispute continued in the international arena and UN resolutions (1948, 
1951, 1957) recommended a ‘fair and free’ plebiscite for Kashmiris. But by 1956, 
Home Minister Gobind Ballabh Pant publicly articulated the idea that ‘Kashmir is an 
integral part of India.’79 In these accounts of the accession of the princely state of 
Jammu and Kashmir to India and subsequent historical events, what becomes evident 
is that popular Kashmiri sovereignty has never been facilitated or enabled. They 
suggest a transfer from the despotic sovereignty of a princely state to the 
undemocratic sovereignty of a postcolonial nation-state. Yet what is important to note 
is that these historical accounts are often invoked in order to make the case for solving 
the Kashmir dispute for geopolitical reasons, rather than outlining the ways in which 
the postcolonial nation-state’s relationship with Kashmir could be described as either 
an imperial or a colonial occupation.   
 
The above discussion regarding the accession of Kashmiri sovereignty suggests the 
necessity of paying attention to the coloniality of (post) colonial sovereignty. Could 
we say that rather than the conventional anti-colonial narrative of Indian 
Independence from British colonialism, that moment of Independence simultaneously 
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needs to be understood as the moment of the acquisition of sovereignty in some 
regions without popular consent? A Marxist perspective might emphasise a bourgeois 
transfer of power from the colonial state to the native elites assuming the territory of 
the nation-state as a given. However, a postcolonial nationalist leadership also 
engaged in transfers of sovereignty in the context of princely states. A similar account 
could be chalked out for the Northeastern states of India, for the princely state of 
Hyderabad, or the Portugese territory of Goa, as each of these contexts have their own 
histories of the transfer of sovereignty.80 The Indian army, for example, invaded Goa 
as well as Hyderabad. In this context, it may be a self-deluding exercise to suggest 
that postcolonial nation-states bore the promise of an anti-colonial or decolonising 
project at the moment of independence as postcolonial theorists often assume. 
Through the lens of the transfer of sovereignty not legitimated by popular will, we 
could argue for the thesis that Indian independence also meant the use of imperial and 
colonial techniques of power exercised by Indian nationalist sovereignty. 
 
Mohamad Junaid’s discussion of occupation and resistance in Kashmir teaches us 
something of the hybrid strategies of Indian colonial and imperial power in a post-
1947 Kashmir. Before the 1990s, Indian rule involved ‘the manipulation of elections’, 
the arrest of political opponents, and the creation of a ‘small wealthy clique with 
interests wedded to the Indian control over Kashmir.’81 After the 1990s, ‘a more 
militarized process’ was put in place ‘primarily aimed at controlling space and 
enforcing this control through violence.’82 This post-1990s transformation is 
described ‘as an ensemble of spatial strategies and violent practices that the occupier 
state employs to dominate physical space in a region where its rule lacks, or has lost, 
popular legitimacy and thus faces an imminent challenge of being popularly 
supplanted.’83 With a fine eye of detail and a nuanced understanding of occupation 
means in Kashmir, Junaid reflects on the relationship between democratic nation-
states and the fundamentally undemocratic practices of occupation. He describes 
‘three faces of democracy’ – ‘as an institutionalized process in the occupier state’; 
‘the undemocratic nature of rule in the occupied regions’ and the ‘floating image of 
democracy (democracy as the “pure sign”) as it hovers, without ever touching the 
ground, in occupied regions.’84 This rather powerful description of democracy’s three 
faces does a particular kind of labour for the Indian nation-state.  It lets it ‘escape 
international (Western) censure for its conduct in Kashmir, but also creates among its 
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own citizens an image of Kashmiri demands as principally undemocratic.’85 In this 
sense, Junaid argues that ‘Democracy is made to serve territorial nationalism, a 
discourse within which occupation, as an ongoing war on the frontiers of the state, 
plays the role of a kind of nationalistic glue that artificially binds the nation 
together.’86 And Kashmir, as Junaid argues, ‘is made to appear as the prime concern 
for India’s “national unity”, and this prime concern is ‘used to paper over the 
unfulfilled needs and demands of postcolonial India’s own disempowered people.’87  
 
Junaid’s discussion of Indian occupation of Kashmir points to the ways in which its 
undemocratic sovereignty draws on the alibi of democracy as a justificatory narrative, 
recalling Nasser Hussain’s discussion of British justification for colonialism through 
the rule of law. The conceptual and discursive terms of postcoloniality, sovereignty, 
and democracy form a closed circle which disallows the acknowledgement of Indian 
imperialism and/or colonialism against different sovereignty struggles, while a much 
easier discourse of Western colonialism and Indian anti-colonialism can be deployed 
by both left progressive as well as right-wing fascist narratives. Through an analysis 
of these strategies, Kashmir’s status as an occupied territory where popular 
sovereignty was never facilitated by the Indian nation-state in 1948 becomes visible.  
 
Beyond these descriptions, the context of Kashmir necessitates a rethinking of the 
ways in which we may make visible or analyse the techniques of imperialism and 
colonialism in a contemporary era.  It may not be adequate to assume that the 
parameters of analyzing colonial sovereignty depend only on the West and the non-
west divide. It is important to note that Euro-American colonial or imperial forms of 
sovereignty may differ from a more classical colonial era in the 15th or the 19th or the 
21st centuries. But alongside these studies, it is necessary to think through 
contemporary forms of colonialism and imperialism exercised by postcolonial nation-
states. The Kashmir case demonstrates that India’s ‘anti-colonial capital’ as having 
successfully fought the colonial British, and its current status as a liberal democracy, 
leads to a certain geopolitical framing of Kashmir: as ‘an integral part of India’ or a 
‘bilateral dispute’ between India and Pakistan. This discursive framing forecloses the 
ways in which colonial and/or imperial techniques of power are exercised in the (post) 
colonial nation-state. If, however, we understand the moment of the 
emergence/independence of postcolonial nation-states as also the expansion of 
 19 
sovereignty over territories not popularly ceded, then we begin to open up space for 
rethinking what we mean by contemporary forms of colonialism and imperialism. 
Such a rethink may enable a more just geopolitical discussion of Kashmiri aspirations 
for self-determination or a future based on popular sovereignty rather than clichéd 
phrases of ‘bilateral relations’, ‘internal matter’, and ‘integral part’ that are echoed 
time and again by India’s colonial justifications of holding on to the territory and 
sovereignty of Kashmir. 
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